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Abstract	
Economists	have	long	investigated	the	cyclical	behavior	of	real	wages	in	order	to	draw	
inferences	regarding	the	relative	stickiness	of	prices	and	wages.		Recent	studies	have	adopted	
techniques	intended	to	identify	monetary	shocks	and	examined	the	response	of	real	wages	and	
output	or	employment	to	such	shocks.		A	finding	that	real	wages	are	procyclical	in	response	to	a	
positive	monetary	policy	shock,	for	example,	is	taken	as	evidence	that	prices	are	stickier	than	wages.			
In	this	paper,	we	show	that	factors	other	than	wage	and	price	stickiness	affect	the	response	of	real	
wages	to	a	monetary	policy	shock.		Accordingly,	examining	the	response	of	real	wages	is	not	enough	
to	sort	out	the	relative	stickiness	of	prices	and	wages.			
We	use	two	prominent	DSGE	models	to	help	us	address	this	issue.		These	models	
incorporate	both	sticky	wages	and	prices	but	in	different	ways.		The	first	model	(Huang,	Liu,	and	
Phaneuf,	American	Economic	Review,	2004)	is	relatively	simple	and	is	not	intended	for	policy	
analysis.		Its	relative	simplicity	allows	us	to	approach	the	issues	both	analytically	and	through	
simulations.		The	second	model	(Smets	and	Wouters,	American	Economic	Review,	2007)	is	a	
relatively	complex	model	of	the	U.S.	economy	with	many	frictions	and	intended	to	be	useful	for	
policy	analysis.		Because	of	its	complexity,	we	must	rely	principally	on	simulation	exercises.				
Using	these	models	we	offer	robust	evidence	that	the	real	wage	response	to	monetary	
policy	is	affected	in	important	ways	by	properties	of	the	economy	other	than	stickiness	of	wages	
and	prices,	such	as	the	importance	of	intermediate	goods	in	the	production	process	and	the	size	of	
key	elasticities.		Consequently,	we	cannot	appropriately	infer	the	relative	stickiness	of	wages	and	
prices	from	examining	only	the	response	of	real	wages	to	a	monetary	policy	shock.	
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Real	Wages	and	Monetary	Policy:	A	DSGE	Approach	
	
Since	the	publication	of	Keynes’s	General	Theory,	economists	have	been	interested	in	the	
cyclical	behavior	of	real	wages.		A	principal	motivation	for	this	interest	has	been	to	provide	
evidence	that	allows	us	to	discriminate	among	alternative	explanations	of	cyclical	fluctuations,	
especially	those	that	rely	on	either	sticky	prices	or	sticky	wages.		The	early	Keynesian	sticky‐wage	
explanation	of	the	business	cycle	fluctuations	predicted	countercyclical	real	wages.		In	that	model,	
nominal	wages	are	fixed	and	employment	is	determined	by	a	stable,	negatively‐sloped	labor	
demand	curve.		Consequently,	an	aggregate	demand	(nominal)	shock	will	cause	real	wages	and	
employment	(output)	to	move	in	opposite	directions.		John	Dunlop’s	(1938)	early	evidence	of	
procyclical	real	wages	was	widely	seen	as	an	important	challenge	to	this	view.		For	many	years	the	
cyclical	behavior	of	real	wages	was	examined	in	numerous	studies	by,	in	one	way	or	another,	
exploring	the	correlation	between	real	wages	and	either	output	or	employment.		Conclusions	varied	
widely	depending	on	the	variables	chosen,	the	sample	period,	or	other	factors.		In	a	survey	paper,	
Stanley	Fischer	(1988)	concluded	that	“the	weight	of	the	evidence	by	now	is	that	the	real	wage	is	
slightly	procyclical.”		This	was	taken	by	many	to	support	the	conclusion	that	prices	have	been	
stickier	than	wages.1	
It	was	eventually	pointed	out	that	the	correlation	between	real	wages	and	output	
(employment)	cannot	be	interpreted	as	simply	reflecting	the	short‐run	real	effects	of	nominal	
shocks	if	the	economy	is,	in	fact,	affected	by	other	shocks	as	well	since	empirical	correlations	reflect	
the	effects	of	all	shocks.		The	issue	has	therefore	become,	how	do	real	wages	respond	to	nominal	
(aggregate	demand)	shocks	setting	all	other	shocks	to	zero?		This	question	cannot	be	answered	by	
looking	at	simple	correlations	between	the	real	wage	rate	and	output	or	employment.	
                                                 
1	For	example,	such	conclusions	were	drawn	by	Bennett	McCallum	(1986),	N.	Gregory	Mankiw	(1987),	and	
Laurence	Ball,	Mankiw,	and	David	Romer	(1988).				
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Accordingly,	more	recent	studies2	have	attempted	to	empirically	identify	monetary	shocks	
and	then	investigate	the	response	of	real	wages	and	output	or	employment	to	such	shocks.		A	
finding	that	real	wages	are	procyclical	in	response	to	a	positive	(expansionary)	monetary	policy	
shock,	for	example,	is	taken	as	evidence	that	prices	are	stickier	than	wages.		For	such	inferences	to	
be	justified,	the	cyclical	response	of	real	wages	must	principally	reflect	the	relative	stickiness	of	
wages	and	prices,	not	other	factors.	
The	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	argue	that	there	are	many	characteristics	of	the	economy	
beyond	wage	and	price	stickiness	that	affect	the	cyclical	response	of	real	wages	to	monetary	policy	
shocks.		Consequently,	even	evidence	regarding	the	cyclical	behavior	of	real	wages	in	response	to	a	
monetary	shock	will	not	allow	us	to	draw	unambiguous	conclusions.		Our	specific	objective	is	to	
investigate	the	broad	array	of	factors	that	affect	the	cyclicality	of	real	wages	including	not	only	the	
relative	stickiness	of	wages	and	prices	but	other	factors	as	well.		Indeed,	we	see	that	the	relative	
stickiness	of	wages	and	prices	represents	only	a	part	of	the	picture.			
To	address	this	issue,	we	take	an	approach	that	is	different	from	earlier	studies.		Rather	
than	taking	the	estimates	from	empirical	models	to	infer	something	about	relative	stickiness,	we	
consider	dynamic	stochastic	general	equilibrium	(DSGE)	models	in	which	we	parameterize	the	
relative	stickiness	of	prices	and	wages	and	then	observe	the	response	of	real	wages	to	a	monetary	
policy	shock.	Using	this	approach	we	can	more	carefully	explore	other	factors	beyond	wage	and	
price	stickiness	that	affect	the	cyclical	response	of	real	wages	to	monetary	shocks.					
We	use	two	prominent	DSGE	models	to	help	us	address	this	question.		These	models	
incorporate	both	sticky	wages	and	prices	but	in	different	ways.		The	first	model	is	relatively	simple	
and	is	not	intended	for	policy	analysis.		Kevin	Huang,	Zheng	Liu,	and	Louis	Phaneuf	(2004),	HLP,	
develop	a	model	to	investigate	the	impact	of	the	changing	importance	of	the	intermediate	goods	
sector	on	the	cyclicality	of	real	wages.		Accordingly,	their	model	is	characterized	by	a	production	
                                                 
2	See,	for	example,	Sumner	and	Silver	(1989),	Gamber	and	Joutz	(1993),	Spencer	(1998),	and	Fleischman	
(1999).	
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function	that	requires	intermediate	goods	as	inputs	as	well	as	capital	and	labor.		Households	
provide	differentiated	labor	skills	to	firms	which	produce	differentiated	goods.		Wage	and	price	
stickiness	is	modeled	using	the	staggered	price	and	staggered	wage	contracts	model	of	John	Taylor	
(1980,	1999)	and	Fischer	(1977).		Given	the	narrow	focus	of	their	paper,	HLP	include	a	monetary	
policy	shock	as	the	only	shock	in	the	model.		Calibrating	the	model,	they	show	that,	given	the	
relative	stickiness	of	prices	and	wages,	the	real	wage	switches	from	being	countercyclical	to	
procyclical	as	the	share	of	intermediate	goods	in	the	production	process	increases.	
The	second	model,	due	to	Frank	Smets	and	Rafael	Wouters	(2007),	SW,	is	a	relatively	
complex	model	of	the	U.S.	economy	with	many	frictions	and	is	intended	for	policy	analysis.		It	
includes	seven	shocks,	one	of	which	is	a	monetary	policy	(interest	rate)	shock.		It	also	incorporates	
differentiated	labor	and	goods,	habit	persistence	in	consumption,	investment	adjustment	costs,	and	
sticky	prices	and	wages	with	partial	backward	indexation	to	past	inflation.		Price	and	wage	
stickiness	is	modeled	using	the	Calvo	(1983)	setup.		The	SW	model’s	primary	parameters	are	
estimated	using	a	Bayesian	likelihood	approach.	
The	next	two	sections	of	the	paper	use	the	HLP	and	SW	models,	respectively,	to	investigate	
how	key	factors	in	those	models	affect	the	cyclicality	of	the	response	of	real	wages	to	monetary	
policy	shocks.		In	each	case,	we	examine	how	the	response	is	affected	as	we	vary	these	key	factors	
over	an	array	of	values	for	wage	and	price	stickiness.		The	third	section	attempts	a	preliminary	
synthesis	of	what	we	have	learned	from	these	exercises	and	the	final	section	provides	a	conclusion.	
I. The	Huang,	Liu,	and	Phaneuf	Model	
The	central	issue	of	the	Huang,	Liu,	and	Phaneuf	(2004),	HLP,	paper	is	to	investigate	how	
the	response	of	real	wages	to	a	monetary	policy	shock	is	affected	by	changes	in	the	input‐output	
structure	of	the	economy	in	the	face	of	wage	and	price	stickiness.		Their	focus	on	real	wages	and	
monetary	policy	makes	their	model	particularly	well	suited	to	our	purposes.		They	construct	a	
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dynamic	stochastic	general	equilibrium,	DSGE,	model	that	is	relatively	simple	and,	thus,	allows	us	to	
approach	the	issues	analytically	as	well	as	through	simulations.	
Their	model	has	differentiated	intermediate	goods	and	differentiated	labor.		Each	
intermediate	goods	producer	supplies	a	unique	good	and	enjoys	some	degree	of	monopoly	power.		
The	same	is	true	of	households	which	supply	unique	forms	of	labor.		Final	goods	producers	
combine	intermediate	goods	into	a	final	good	which	can	be	used	for	consumption,	investment,	or	as	
an	input	in	the	production	of	intermediate	goods.		Similarly,	the	various	unique	forms	of	labor	are	
aggregated	into	a	labor	composite	which	is	also	used	in	the	production	of	intermediate	goods.	
Any	particular	intermediate	good	is	produced	using	three	inputs:	capital,	labor	and	an	
aggregation	of	all	intermediate	goods.		The	importance	of	final	goods	is	summarized	by	the	key	
parameter	φ,	which	is	the	Cobb‐Douglas	share	of	intermediate	goods	(as	opposed	to	capital	and	
labor)	in	the	goods	production	function.	
Suppliers	of	intermediate	goods	and	labor	set	prices	using	a	staggered	Taylor‐style	price	
setting	arrangement.		That	is,	contracts	are	set	for	N	periods	and	one‐Nth	of	the	firms	(or	
households)	are	allowed	to	set	prices	each	period.		Intermediate	goods	producers	and	labor	
suppliers	solve	two	types	of	problems.		First,	given	their	fixed	price	or	wage	set	previously,	they	
choose	the	optimal	amount	to	supply	each	period.		Second,	every	N	periods	they	choose	what	the	
fixed	price	or	wage	will	be	for	the	next	N	periods.	
Households	are	allowed	to	insure	their	consumption	each	period	via	a	set	of	complete	
financial	markets.		Hence,	every	household	consumes	the	same	amount,	but	it	will	supply	differing	
amounts	of	labor	based	on	their	previously	chosen	fixed	wage.	
There	is	a	monetary	authority	that	creates	new	money	each	period	and	transfers	it	lump‐
sum	to	the	households.		The	growth	rate	of	the	money	supply	is	assumed	to	follow	an	AR(1)	process.	
HLP	focus	on	the	parameter	 ,	the	importance	of	intermediate	goods	in	the	
production	function	(with	a	value	of	zero	reflecting	a	zero	share	of	intermediate	goods	in	
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production).		They	look	at	this	in	the	context	of	three	specific	models:	the	first	with	staggered	price‐
setting	and	flexible	wages,	the	second	with	staggered	wage‐setting	and	flexible	prices,	and	the	third	
with	both	staggered	price‐	and	wage‐setting.		They	show	that,	given	a	calibrated	parameterization	
of	the	model,	when	prices	are	sticky	and	wages	flexible,	real	wages	respond	procyclically	to	a	
monetary	policy	shock	regardless	of	the	value	of	φ.		In	the	reverse	situation	with	sticky	wages	and	
flexible	prices,	their	model	implies	that	real	wages	respond	countercyclically	to	a	monetary	policy	
shock	regardless	of	the	value	of	φ.3			
In	the	model	with	both	price	and	wage	stickiness,	however,	the	response	of	real	wages	to	a	
monetary	policy	shock	depends	critically	on	φ.		When	φ	is	small	so	intermediate	goods	are	not	so	
important	in	the	production	process,	real	wages	tend	to	be	countercyclical	in	response	to	monetary	
policy	shocks	and,	when	φ	is	large,	real	wages	are	procyclical.		Since,	by	assumption,	wages	and	
prices	are	equally	sticky	in	the	third	model,	we	see	that	the	cyclical	behavior	of	real	wages	does	not	
have	unambiguous	implications	for	the	relative	stickiness	of	wages	and	prices.		Thus,	HLP	show	
that	other	factors,	in	particular	the	importance	of	intermediate	goods	in	production,	will	also	affect	
the	cyclicality	of	real	wages.		This	is	an	important	finding.	
We	use	the	HLP	model	to	consider	how	the	cyclicality	of	the	response	of	real	wages	to	a	
monetary	shock	is	affected	by	other	properties	of	the	model.		For	example,	how	is	the	cyclicality	of	
the	real	wage	affected	by	changing	the	relative	stickiness	of	prices	and	wages	for	various	values	of	
φ?		Several	other	parameters	play	potentially	important	roles	in	the	model:	 ,	the	
elasticity	of	substitution	between	differentiated	labor	skills,	 ,	the	elasticity	of	substitution	
between	differentiated	goods,	 ,	the	elasticity	of	value	added	with	respect	to	capital,	
,	the	inverse	of	the	elasticity	of	intertemporal	substitution	of	labor	hours,	and	 ,	the	
capital	adjustment	cost	parameter.		Accordingly,	we	also	examine	how	the	cyclical	response	of	real	
wages	changes	as	these	parameters	are	varied.			
                                                 
3	These	results	are	reminiscent	of	the	underlying	motivation	behind	the	empirical	debate	regarding	the	
relative	stickiness	of	prices	and	wages	discussed	in	the	opening	section	of	this	paper.	
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A. Varying	Price	and	Wage	Stickiness	
As	indicated	above,	the	HLP	model	incorporates	price	and/or	wage	stickiness	using	the	
staggered	price‐	and	wage‐setting	models	of	Taylor	(1980,	1999)	and	Fischer	(1977).		In	this	setup,	
each	firm	(worker)	faces	a	price	(wage)	contract	of	length	Np	(Nw).		During	each	period,	fraction	
1/Np	(1/Nw)	of	the	firms	(workers)	choose	a	new	price	(wage)	optimally	that	will	last	for	Np	(Nw)	
periods.		Since	they	focus	on	the	role	of	changes	in	φ,	in	their	reported	results,	HLP	choose	to	set	Np	
=	Nw	=	4.		What	happens	to	the	cyclical	behavior	of	real	wages	when,	for	various	values	of	φ,	we	
consider	an	array	of	other	values	for	Np	and	Nw?		Selected	impulse	response	function	(IRF)	results	
are	reported	in	Table	1.		Retaining	the	HLP	postwar	calibrated	parameter	values	for	σ,	θ,	and	α,4	we	
vary	the	integer	values	of	Np	and	Nw	between	1	and	8	for	each	of	HLP’s	interwar	and	postwar	
calibrated	values	of	φ,	0.4	and	0.7.		The	results	reported	in	Table	1	are	the	first	period	(one	quarter)	
responses	of	the	real	wage	rate	to	a	one	percent	positive	shock	to	the	money	growth	rate	with	each	
matrix	corresponding	to	a	different	value	of	φ.5		For	example,	when	 	and	Np	=	Nw	=	4,	a	one	
percent	increase	in	the	money	growth	rate	causes	a	0.30	percent	increase	in	the	real	wage	rate	after	
one	quarter.6			
	
[Insert	Table	1	about	here.]	
	
The	bold	line	in	each	matrix	indicates	the	dividing	line	between	countercyclical	and	
procyclical	real	wages.		There	are	three	things	to	notice.		First,	if	prices	are	sticky	(Np	>	1)	but	wages	
                                                 
4	The	HLP	parameter	values	are	σ	=	3,	θ	=	11,	and	α	=	0.4.	
5	To	obtain	the	results	reported	in	Table	1,	we	simulate	the	model	for	each	of	the	630	specified	parametric	
configurations.		In	each	case,	we	compute	the	impulse	response	function	(IRF)	for	the	real	wage	with	respect	
to	a	one	percent	money	growth	shock	and	report	the	first	(one	quarter	horizon)	value.		Since	it	would	be	
impractical	to	report	the	full	IRF	for	each	case,	we	take	the	magnitude	and	especially	the	sign	of	this	first	IRF	
coefficient	to	be	an	indicator	of	the	cyclical	response	of	the	real	wage	to	a	monetary	policy	shock.		Since	a	
positive	shock	to	money	growth	will	result	in	an	increase	in	employment,	a	negative	effect	on	the	real	wage	
indicates	a	countercyclical	response	of	real	wages.	
6	This	matches	the	result	obtained	by	HLP	and	reported	in	their	Figure	3.B.:		see	their	IRF	for	φ	=	0.7	at	the	
first	quarter	horizon.	
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are	flexible	(Nw	=	1),	real	wages	are	strongly	procyclical	and	changing	the	value	of	φ	makes	little	
difference.		Similarly,	if	wages	are	sticky	(Nw	>	1)	but	prices	are	flexible	(Np	=	1),	real	wages	are	
strongly	countercyclical	and	changing	the	value	of	φ	makes	no	difference	whatsoever.		This,	of	
course,	simply	confirms	and	extends	the	original	HLP	results.7		Second,	for	any	given	values	of	φ	
and	Np,	real	wages	are	more	countercyclical	for	larger	values	of	Nw.		These	results	are	intuitive	given	
that,	other	things	equal,	stickier	nominal	wages	imply	more	procyclical	real	wages.		Third,	as	φ	
increases,	the	range	of	values	of	Np	and	Nw	for	which	real	wages	are	countercyclical	decreases.		This	
generalizes	the	principal	result	reported	by	HLP	for	Np	=	Nw	=	4:8		For	any	combination	of	Np	and	Nw,	
real	wages	become	more	procyclical	as	the	importance	of	intermediate	goods	in	production	
increases.		HLP	explain	that	this	happens	because	an	increase	in	φ	increases	the	sluggishness	of	
movements	in	marginal	cost.		This,	in	turn,	increases	the	sluggishness	of	nominal	prices	and	allows	
the	procyclicality	of	nominal	wages	to	dominate	the	real	wage.	
B. Varying	Other	Parameters	
We	also	investigate	what	happens	to	the	cyclicality	of	real	wages	as	we	vary	the	elasticity	
parameters,	σ,	θ,	α,	and	ξ	as	well	as	the	capital	adjustment	cost	parameter	ψ.			
Table	2	reports	the	results	for	variations	of	σ,	the	elasticity	of	substitution	between	
differentiated	labor	skills.		The	separate	grids	assume	the	values	of	σ	to	be	1.5,	3.0,	11.0.		Since	the	
wage	markup	is	 ,	these	values	imply	wage	markup	coefficients	of	3.0,	1.5,	and	1.1	respectively.	
By	reviewing	the	grids	in	sequence,	we	can	see	what	happens	as	σ	increases.	First,	if	wages	are	
sticky	(Nw	>	1),	as	 	increases,	real	wages	become	more	countercyclical	for	any	given	pair	of	price	
and	wage	stickiness	parameters.	Second,	if	wages	are	flexible	(Nw		=	1),	changes	in	 	have	no	
influence	on	the	cyclicality	of	the	real	wage	whatsoever.		
                                                 
7	See	the	real	wage	IRFs	reported	in	their	Figures	1	and	2.	
8 Of	course,	our	results	confirm	theirs	for	the	specific	case	examined	by	HLP.		For	Np	=	Nw	=	4,	when	
,	the	real	wage	is	slightly	countercyclical.		For	Np	=	Nw	=	4,	when	 ,	the	real	wage	
becomes	procyclical.		See	the	corresponding	IRFs	at	the	one‐quarter	horizon	in	their	Figure	3.B.	
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The	first	phenomenon	occurs	because	individuals,	when	able	to	re‐contract	their	wage,	face	
a	tradeoff	between	a	higher	nominal	wage	and	an	increase	in	hours	employed.	This	tradeoff	is	
highlighted	by	varying	the	elasticity	of	substitution	between	differentiated	labor.	If	the	elasticity	is	
high	(markup	is	low),	the	labor	aggregator	will	prefer	an	individual	with	a	wage	lower	than	the	
fixed	wages	of	others.	Alternatively,	if	the	elasticity	is	low	(markup	is	high),	labor	demand	will	be	
slow	to	decrease	even	if	the	individual	increases	her	wage.	Therefore,	nominal	wages	are	less	
procyclical	(and	even	countercyclical)	when	 	is	high	and	more	procyclical	when	 	is	low.			Since	
prices	are	generally	procyclical,	as	σ	rises,	the	real	wage	becomes	increasingly	countercyclical.	
The	second	phenomenon,	that	changing	the	elasticity	has	no	effect	when	wages	are	flexible,	
is	explained	by	noting	that	if	every	wage	is	re‐contracted	each	period,	there	is	no	ability	to	undercut	
other	laborers.	Thus,	the	incentive	to	increase	the	nominal	wage	is	unchallenged.	This	incentive	is	
not	affected	by	the	elasticity	of	substitution	without	the	countering	incentive,	so	changing	 	has	no	
influence	on	the	cyclicality	of	the	real	wage.	
	
[Insert	Table	2	about	here.]	
	
The	HLP	model	implies	that	varying	θ,	the	elasticity	of	substitution	between	differentiated	
goods,	makes	no	difference	in	the	response	of	real	wages	to	a	monetary	shock.		In	general,	because	
of	staggered	wage	setting,	the	real	wage	is	a	weighted	average	of	markups	over	past,	present,	and	
expected	future	values	of	the	marginal	rate	of	substitution	between	consumption	and	leisure,	MRS.		
Since	the	MRS	is	not	a	function	of	θ,	varying	the	value	of	θ	will	have	no	effect	on	the	cyclicality	of	the	
real	wage.		We	have	confirmed	this	by	computing	the	first	IRF	coefficients	for	various	values	of	θ	
and	obtain	results	identical	to	those	reported	in	Table	1.9	
                                                 
9 We	include	the	relevant	tables	for	θ	=	1.5,	3.0,	and	11.0	in	an	Appendix	available	from	the	authors.	
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We	have	conducted	similar	exercises	with	the	following	values	of	α,	the	elasticity	of	value	
added	with	respect	to	capital:	0.2,	0.4,	and	0.6.		We	have	held	σ	and	θ	constant	at	their	HLP	
calibrated	values.		As	α	increases,	the	absolute	value	of	the	first	IRF	coefficient	rises,	but	the	locus	of	
acyclicality	over	the	range	of	price	and	wage	contract	length	(the	bold	line)	does	not	change.		To	
save	space,	we	do	not	report	the	results	here.10	
The	intuition	here	is	easier	to	follow	if	we	again	think	of	the	limiting	case	where	all	prices	
and	wages	are	flexible.		In	this	case	the	share	of	labor	in	GDP	is	 .		Hence	the	percent	change	in	
the	real	wage	is	the	percent	change	in	GDP	minus	the	percent	change	in	the	labor	input.		The	
aggregate	production	function	for	the	HLP	model	with	perfect	flexibility	is	a	modified	Cobb‐Douglas.		
Combining	these	gives	the	following	breakdown	of	the	percentage	change	in	the	real	wage.	
	 	
where	a	carat	( )		indicates	percent	change.		That	is,	the	percent	change	in	the	real	wage	is	α	times	
the	percent	change	in	the	capital‐labor	ratio.		The	latter	could	be	either	positive	or	negative,	but	is	
largely	unaffected	by	α.		Hence	as	α	rises	the	responsiveness	of	the	real	wage	will	become	larger	in	
absolute	value,	but	will	not	change	sign.	
	 The	parameter	 	measures	the	elasticity	of	intertemporal	labor	substitution.	We	examine	
four	values	between	1.0	and	10.0.		The	results	reported	in	Table	3	indicate	that	changing	 	makes	
very	little	difference	when	wages	are	very	sticky	relative	to	prices	(the	lower	left	corner	area	of	
each	grid),	but	that	the	real	wage	becomes	much	more	procyclical	when	wages	are	close	to	flexible	
and	prices	are	very	sticky	(corresponding	to	the	upper	right	corner	area	of	each	grid)	as	 	increases.	
As	a	person	becomes	more	willing	to	substitute	labor	tomorrow	for	leisure	today,	they	become	
more	likely	to	increase	their	wage	if	the	incentive	to	undercut	other	labor	is	low	(wage	contracts	
are	short),	especially	if	inflation	is	low	in	the	short	run	(price	contracts	are	long).	
	
                                                 
10 All results not reported here are in an Appendix available from the authors. 
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[Insert	Table	3	about	here.]	
	
As	noted	by	HLP	(see	their	footnote	13),	the	behavior	of	real	wages	is	not	sensitive	to	the	
capital	adjustment	cost	parameter,	ψ.		This	is	not	a	feature	of	the	underlying	model	but,	rather,	is	a	
consequence	of	log‐linearization.		After	linearization,	the	quadratic	adjustment	costs	become	linear.	
To	summarize,	we	have	discovered	that,	in	the	HLP	model,	real	wages	become	more	
procyclical	in	response	to	a	monetary	policy	shock	1)	the	more	important	intermediate	goods	are	in	
the	production	process	(the	larger	φ),	2)	the	stickier	prices	are	relative	to	wages	(the	larger	Np	is	
relative	to	Nw),	and	3)	the	smaller	the	elasticity	of	substitution	between	labor	skills	(the	smaller	σ).		
On	the	other	hand,	variation	in	either	the	elasticity	of	substitution	between	goods	(θ)	or	in	the	
elasticity	of	value	added	with	respect	to	capital	(α)	has	little	or	no	effect	on	(at	least	the	direction	of)	
the	cyclical	response	of	real	wages.	
II. The	Smets	and	Wouters	(SW)	Model	
The	Smets	and	Wouters	(2007),	SW,	model	is	a	popular	model	for	analyzing	monetary	
policy	in	the	U.S.		However,	being	considerably	more	complex	than	the	HLP	model,	it	is	much	more	
difficult	to	analytically	evaluate	the	factors	that	influence	the	cyclical	behavior	of	real	wages.		We	
rely	principally	on	simulation	experiments	to	draw	our	conclusions.	
The	SW	DSGE	model	employs	several	real	and	nominal	rigidities	in	a	differentiated	goods	
market	and	a	differentiated	labor	market.	Households	maximize	utility	by	choosing	infinite‐horizon	
consumption	and	labor	paths	assuming	habit	formation	in	consumption.	Households	also	
accumulate	capital	subject	to	capital	adjustment	costs	and	rent	a	variable	amount	of	that	capital	to	
firms.	Firms	produce	unique	goods	by	choosing	capital	and	labor	inputs.		
Rather	than	assuming	staggered	prices	and	wages	as	HLP,	SW	model	stickiness	for	prices	
and	wages	using	a	Calvo	(1983)	mechanism	where	only	a	randomly	selected	fraction	of	firms	and	
households	are	permitted	to	renegotiate	contracts	each	period.	The	parameters	governing	these	
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fractions	are	denoted	 	and	 	where	 	is	the	proportion	of	firms	allowed	to	re‐optimize	
prices	each	period	and	where	 	is	the	corresponding	value	for	households	and	their	wage	
contracts.	The	SW	model	assumes	that	those	firms	and	households	not	selected	to	update	their	
contracts	have	their	prices	and	wages	partially	indexed	to	past	inflation.	
Were	prices	and	wages	fully	flexible	(i.e.	 ),	they	would	be	equal	to	a	constant	
markup	over	the	marginal	product	of	labor	and	marginal	rate	of	substitution	between	consumption	
and	leisure,	respectively.	Analogous	to	the	HLP	parameters	 	and	 ,	the	SW	parameters	 	and	 	
capture	these	markup	coefficients	with	 	and	 	being	the	price	and	wage	markups,	
respectively.	
The	model	is	closed	by	assuming	the	monetary	authority	sets	the	interest	rate	according	to	
a	generalized	Taylor	rule.	
Seven	components	of	the	model	are	influenced	by	stochastic	processes:	total	factor	
productivity,	investment‐specific	technology,	the	risk	premium,	exogenous	(government)	spending,	
the	price	mark‐up,	the	wage	mark‐up,	and	monetary	policy.		
SW	use	a	Bayesian	likelihood	approach	to	estimate	their	model	for	the	U.S.	over	1966:1	–	
2004:4.		Because	the	Calvo	price‐	and	wage‐stickiness	parameters	are	so	important	for	the	cyclical	
behavior	of	the	real	wage,	we	have	investigated	the	sensitivity	of	these	estimates	to	alternative	
priors.		Though	we	find	that	the	posterior	means	for	ξp	vary	between	0.47	and	0.76	and	the	
posterior	means	for	ξw	vary	between	0.66	and	0.88,	we	always	find	strong	support	for	significant	
price	and	wage	stickiness.		
Once	again,	our	principal	interest	is	in	discovering	how	changing	key	parameters	of	the	
model	affects	the	cyclical	response	of	real	wages	to	monetary	policy	shocks	where,	in	contrast	to	
the	HLP	model,	monetary	policy	follows	a	generalized	Taylor	rule	so	monetary	policy	shocks	are	
interest	rate	shocks	rather	than	money	supply	shocks.		Given	its	complexity,	the	SW	model	has	
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many	parameters	and	other	properties	that	could	potentially	be	examined.		In	order	to	maintain	a	
manageable	project,	we	must	be	selective.	
A. 	Varying	Price	and	Wage	Stickiness	
As	in	the	HLP	model,	we	begin	by	investigating	the	impact	of	changes	in	the	relative	
stickiness	of	prices	and	wages.		Whereas	the	HLP	model	assumed	staggered	prices	and	wages	with	a	
fixed	deterministic	contract	length,	price	and	wage	stickiness	in	the	SW	model	is	captured	by	
assuming	separate	stochastic	Calvo	mechanisms	for	prices	and	wages.		We	vary	the	Calvo	price	and	
wage	parameters,	ξp	and	ξw,	and,	as	above,	examine	the	consequences	for	the	effect	of	a	one	
standard	deviation	monetary	policy	shock	on	the	real	wage	after	one	quarter	as	given	by	the	value	
of	the	corresponding	IRF	at	a	horizon	of	one	quarter.		We	allow	ξp	and	ξw	to	each	vary	between	0.0	
and	1.0	in	increments	of	0.1.11		In	this	exercise,	for	each	pair	of	selected	values,	we	retain	all	other	
parameters	at	their	original	estimated	values.		The	results	are	reported	in	Table	4.		Each	cell	entry	
reports	the	first	quarter	response	of	the	real	wage	to	a	one‐standard	deviation	expansionary	shock	
to	monetary	policy;	i.e.,	a	one‐standard‐deviation	decline	in	the	interest	rate.			
	
[Insert	Table	4	about	here.]	
	
Once	again,	the	bold	line	in	the	grid	indicates	the	dividing	line	between	countercyclical	and	
procyclical	real	wages.	The	results	are	broadly	similar	to	those	reported	for	the	HLP	model.		We	
confirm	that	if	prices	are	sticky	(ξp	>	0.0)	but	wages	are	flexible	(ξw	=	0.0),	real	wages	are	strongly	
procyclical.		Similarly,	if	wages	are	sticky	(ξw	>	0.0)	but	prices	are	flexible	(ξp	=	0.0),	real	wages	are	
                                                 
11	Since,	under	the	usual	Calvo	assumptions,	firms	reset	their	prices	(households	reset	their	wages)	with	
probability	1	‐	ξp	(1	‐	ξw),	when	ξp	=	0.0	(ξw	=	0.0)	all	prices	(wages)	are	flexible.		Though	the	model	cannot	be	
solved	numerically	in	the	case	that	both	prices	and	wages	are	perfectly	flexible	(ξp	=	ξw	=	0.0),	theory	suggests	
the	real	wage	would	be	acyclical	in	response	to	a	monetary	shock.	The	model	is	similarly	numerically	
intractable	when	both	prices	and	wages	are	perfectly	fixed	(ξp	=	ξw	=	1.0).	
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strongly	countercyclical.	Furthermore,	we	see	that	the	stickier	are	wages	(the	larger	is	ξw),	the	more	
likely	real	wages	are	to	be	countercyclical	even	with	some	degree	of	price	stickiness.			
In	order	to	draw	comparisons	between	the	results	of	Table	4	and	the	related	results	from	
the	HLP	model	reported	in	Table	1,	it	is	first	necessary	to	have	a	mapping	between	the	stickiness	
parameters	of	the	staggered	contract	and	Calvo	models.		We	note	that	 	is	often	
interpreted	as	the	average	duration	(length)	of	price	contracts.12		Dixon	and	Kara	(2005)	show,	
however,	that	this	ratio	is	correctly	interpreted	as	the	average	age	of	price	contracts.		This	
confusion	has	led	some	to	an	incorrect	mapping	between	ξp		and	Np.		As	shown	by	Dixon	and	Kara,	
the	correct	mapping	is	 	,	or,	equivalently,	 .		So,	for	Np	=	4,	the	contract	length	
assumed	by	HLP	in	their	model,	the	corresponding	value	for	the	Calvo	parameter,	ξp,	is	0.6.		A	
similar	mapping	holds	for	wage	stickiness	parameters.			
To	consider	a	single	comparison,	let	Np	=	Nw	=	4	and,	thus,	ξp	=	ξw	=	0.6.		We	note	that	for	the	
HLP	model,	when	φ	=	0.7,13	it’s	calibrated	value	for	the	postwar	U.S.	economy,	real	wages	are	
procyclical.		The	SW	model	also	produces	procyclical	real	wages.		A	broader	comparison	suggests	
that	real	wages	tend	to	respond	more	procyclically	in	the	SW	model	than	the	HLP	model	for	
comparable	degrees	of	price	and	wage	stickiness.14	
B. Varying	the	Steady	State	Markup	Parameters	
                                                 
12	For	example,	Christiano,	Eichenbaum,	and	Evans	(2005)	and	Smets	and	Wouters	(2007)	refer	to	this	ratio	
as	giving	the	average	duration	of	price	contracts.		Christiano,	Eichenbaum,	and	Evans	further	suggest	a	
mapping	consistent	with	 .	
13	As	HLP	emphasize	in	their	model,	the	cyclical	response	of	real	wages	to	monetary	policy	shocks	depends	
critically	on	the	value	of	this	parameter	which	summarizes	the	relative	importance	of	intermediate	goods	in	
production.		This	parameter,	however,	does	not	have	a	counterpart	in	the	SW	model.		Thus,	to	compare	the	
results	of	the	two	models,	we	must	choose	a	value	of	φ	for	the	HLP	model	that	“fits	the	data”	since	the	SW	
model	is	estimated	using	U.S.	data.		HLP	suggest	that	a	value	of	0.7	is	appropriate	for	the	post‐war	U.S.	
economy.	
14	For	example,	when	Np	=	2	(ξp	=	0.33)	and	Nw	=	3	(ξp	=	0.5),	the	HLP	model	produces	countercyclical	real	
wages	in	response	to	a	monetary	shock	while	the	SW	model	produces	procyclical	real	wages.	
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We	also	investigate	the	effects	of	varying	the	steady	state	markup	parameters	in	both	the	
labor	and	goods	markets,	 	and	 	respectively.		These	exactly	correspond	to	the	markups	
related	to	σ	and	θ	in	the	HLP	model,	 	and	 	respectively.	SW	calibrate	 	to	be	1.5	and	
estimate	 	to	be	1.6.		As	in	our	experiment	for	 	and	 	in	HLP,	we	let	 	and	 	each	take	on	
values	of	1.5,	3.0,	and	11.0	corresponding	to	steady	state	markups	of		3.0,	1.5,	and	1.1,	respectively.		
The	results	are	reported	in	Tables	5	and	6.	From	Table	5,	we	see	that	for	any	given	value	of	 ,	real	
wages	become	more	countercyclical	as	 	increases,	which	is	analogous	to	the	results	for	the	HLP	
model	(recall	Table	2).	On	the	other	hand,	for	a	fixed	value	of	 ,	as	we	see	in	Table	6,	real	wages	
become	slightly	more	countercyclical	as	the	price	markup	increases.	Recall	that	in	HLP,	varying	the	
θ,	the	corresponding	parameter,	had	no	influence	on	the	real	wage	cyclicality.	As	the	SW	model	has	
a	less	transparent	monetary	transmission	mechanism,	we	hypothesize	that,	unlike	in	the	HLP	
model,	the	price	markup	does	indirectly	influence	the	MRS	(marginal	rate	of	substitution	between	
consumption	and	leisure)	in	such	a	way	as	to	incentivize	early	earnings	over	undercutting	other	
laborers’	wages.		
	
[Insert	Tables	5‐6	about	here.]				
	
C. 	Varying	the	Elasticity	of	Intertemporal	Labor	Substitution	
Now	we	investigate	the	effect	of	changing	the	labor	supply	elasticity	in	the	SW	model.	We	
examine	the	cyclical	response	of	real	wages	for	four	alternative	values	of	the	labor	supply	elasticity,	
σl:		1.0,	1.5,	3.0,	and	10.0.		The	SW	estimated	value	is	1.53.		Our	results	are	reported	in	Table	7.		Note	
that	the	other	parameter	values	are	not	reestimated,	but	taken	at	the	values	estimated	by	SW.		
	
[Insert	Table	7	about	here.]	
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We	note	that,	when	prices	are	completely	flexible	and	wages	fully	sticky	(ξp	=	0.0	and	ξw	=	
1.0),	changes	in	labor	supply	elasticity	make	essentially	no	difference.		This	must	reflect	the	fact	
that	when	prices	are	fully	flexible	and	wages	are	fixed	by	contract,	the	effective	labor	supply	curve	
becomes	perfectly	elastic	(horizontal)	and	the	elasticity	of	the	utility‐maximizing	labor	supply	
curve	is	irrelevant.15		On	the	other	hand,	when	prices	are	fully	sticky	and	wages	flexible	(ξp	=	1.0	and	
ξw	=	0.0),	changes	in	labor	supply	elasticity	make	a	much	larger	difference	in	the	cyclical	response	of	
real	wages.	
Overall,	however,	even	though	the	range	of	values	for	the	labor	supply	elasticity	is	quite	
wide,	changes	don’t	make	a	substantial	difference	in	the	cyclical	response	of	real	wages	to	monetary	
shocks.		In	particular,	the	reference	line	dividing	the	range	of	countercyclical	and	procyclical	real	
wages	does	not	change	markedly	as	we	increase	the	labor	supply	elasticity	from	1.0	to	10.0.	This	
result	is	similar	to	the	HLP	results	for	 	where	we	also	observed	very	little	change	in	the	magnitude	
or	direction	of	cyclicality.	While	we	do	observe	some	movement	in	the	procyclical	direction	as	 	
increases	when	wages	are	flexible	and	prices	sticky,	the	magnitude	of	change	is	far	smaller	than	in	
the	HLP	results.	
D. Varying	the	Kimball	Aggregator	Parameter	
Traditional	DSGE	models	have	typically	used	the	Dixit‐Stiglitz	(CES)	aggregator	in	the	labor	
and	intermediate	goods	markets.		SW	use	the	more	general	Kimball	aggregator;	see	Kimball	(1995).		
The	Kimball	aggregator	is	more	flexible	in	that	it	allows	the	elasticity	of	demand	to	increase	as	
relative	price	increases	depending	on	the	value	of	the	Kimball	parameter,	ε.		The	Dixit‐Stiglitz	
model	is	a	special	case	with	ε	=	0.		The	Kimball	aggregator	is	applied	in	both	the	goods	and	labor	
markets	with	parameters	denoted	εp	and	εw	respectively.		SW	calibrated	the	values	of	both	εp	and	εw	
                                                 
15 Note that this explanation would indicate that there would be no change in the cyclicality of the real wage as the 
elasticity varies. As our results are asymptotic approximations of the perfectly sticky and fully flexible cases, we 
only observe approximate invariance to the elasticity. 
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to	be	10.0;	these	are	the	values	assumed	for	all	previous	tables	reporting	results	for	the	SW	model.		
Here	we	consider	two	additional	values:	εp	=	εw	=	0.0	which	collapses	to	the	Dixit‐Stiglitz	special	
case	and	εp	=	εw	=	33.0	which	is	the	value	suggested	by	Kimball	in	his	original	paper.		A	higher	value	
of	εp	means	that	the	demand	for	differentiated	goods	becomes	more	elastic	as	the	relative	price	
increases.		Similarly,	a	higher	value	of	εw	means	that	the	demand	for	differentiated	labor	becomes	
more	elastic	as	the	relative	wage	increases.		
While	we	have	investigated	the	consequences	of	varying	the	value	of	εp	for	each	of	the	three	
choices	of	values	of	εw,	to	save	space,	we	report	only	a	subset	of	these	results	in	Table	8.16	There,	we	
see	evidence	that,	given	εp,	increasing	εw	implies	greater	real	wage	countercyclicality	and,	given	εw,	
increasing	εp	implies	less	real	wage	countercyclicality.		From	the	full	results,	we	find	that,	as	we	
increase	εp	and	εw	together,	there	is	only	a	negligible	effect	on	the	countercyclical	response	of	real	
wages.	
	
[Insert	Table	8	about	here.]	
	
To	understand	the	phenomenon	observed	in	Table	8,	consider	the	market	for	labor.	As	the	
curvature	of	labor	demand	(εw)	increases,	the	labor	demand	curve	bows	away	from	the	origin.	For	
points	on	the	curve	with	higher	wages	than	at	the	inflection	point	(where	our	market	likely	will	be	
in	equilibrium	given	the	monopoly	power	of	the	households),	this	implies	a	less	steep	curve.	Thus,	
when	the	labor	supply	curve	shifts	up	in	response	to	a	monetary	policy	shock,	the	corresponding	
change	in	nominal	wage	will	be	smaller	for	higher	levels	of	curvature.	Thus	our	real	wages	will	be	
more	countercyclical.	
                                                 
16 The full results are contained in an Appendix available from the authors on request. 
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The	result	for	changes	in	εp	is	explained	by	similar	reference	to	the	intermediate	goods	
market.	Changes	in	price	will	be	less	drastic	for	higher	curvature,	leading	to	a	more	procyclical	real	
wage	in	response	to	a	monetary	policy	shock.	
	
III. Summary	
Our	investigation	has	confirmed	that,	as	expected,	relative	wage	and	price	stickiness	plays	a	
very	important	role	in	the	cyclical	response	of	real	wages	to	monetary	policy	shocks.		Furthermore,	
we	obtain	qualitatively	similar	results	for	two	models.		For	both	the	HLP	and	SW	DSGE	models,	as	
wages	become	stickier	relative	to	prices,	real	wages	become	more	countercyclical	in	response	to	
changes	in	monetary	policy.		However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	a	procyclical	real	wage	response	
does	not	necessarily	mean	that	prices	are	stickier	than	wages	as	measured	by	the	stickiness	
parameters	of	these	models.		Indeed,	in	both	models,	other	things	equal,	when	wages	and	prices	are	
equally	sticky,	real	wages	tend	to	be	procyclical.		Thus,	merely	from	the	observation	that	real	wages	
seem	to	respond	procyclically	to	monetary	shocks,	it	is	misguided	to	conclude,	as	some	have	done,17	
that	prices	are	stickier	than	wages.		This	reflects	the	fact	that	there	are	other	important	factors	that	
are	relevant	to	the	behavior	of	real	wages.		The	major	purpose	of	our	investigation	has	been	to	
examine	these	other	factors.		We	have	discovered	that	some	of	them	have	significant	effects.	
Both	models	have	revealed	that	the	elasticity	of	substitution	between	differentiated	labor	
and	the	implied	wage	markup	coefficients	are	important.		When	wages	are	sticky,	real	wages	
become	more	countercyclical	in	response	to	a	monetary	shock	as	this	elasticity	increases	regardless	
of	the	stickiness	of	prices.		The	models	offer	slightly	different	(but	not	opposite)	implications	when	
wages	are	flexible:		In	the	HLP	model,	increases	in	this	elasticity	have	no	effect	while	in	the	SW	
model	we	see	slightly	more	countercyclical	wages	in	this	case.		We	ascribe	this	difference	to	the	
higher	complexity	of	the	SW	model	which	allows	more	complicated	effects.		
                                                 
17 See the discussion in the introduction to this paper and the references cited there. 
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The	models	are	in	broad	agreement	regarding	the	effects	of	changes	in	the	elasticity	of	
intertemporal	labor	substitution.		Both	models	suggest	that	when	wages	are	sticky	relative	to	prices,	
increases	in	this	elasticity	have	a	rather	small	effect.		On	the	other	hand,	when	prices	are	sticky	
relative	to	wages,	increases	in	this	elasticity	cause	the	real	wage	to	respond	more	procyclically	to	a	
monetary	policy	shock.		
Each	model	also	has	parameters	that	seem	to	play	an	important	role	for	which	there	is	no	
counterpart	in	the	other.		For	example,	a	key	parameter	in	the	HLP	model,	φ,	reflects	the	relative	
importance	of	intermediate	goods	in	production.		We	confirm	and	extend	the	HLP	finding	that	
increases	in	φ	cause	real	wages	to	be	more	procyclical	for	all	pairs	of	wage	and	price	stickiness	
parameter	values.		As	indicated	by	HLP,	this	is	consistent	with	the	conventional	wisdom	regarding	
the	changing	cyclicality	of	real	wages	during	the	postwar	period	in	which	intermediate	goods	have	
become	increasingly	important.	
The	SW	model	also	includes	a	more	flexible	aggregator	function,	the	Kimball	aggregator.		
This	aggregator	generalizes	the	usual	Dixit‐Stiglitz	aggregator	by	including	an	additional	parameter	
which	allows	the	elasticity	of	demand	to	increase	as	relative	price	increases.		We	find	that	if	the	
Kimball	parameter	increases	symmetrically	in	both	the	intermediate	goods	and	labor	markets,	it	
has	little	effect	on	the	cyclical	response	of	real	wages.		However,	if	the	value	of	the	Kimball	
parameter	is	larger	in	goods	markets	than	labor	markets,	this	will	produce	more	procyclical	real	
wages.		
IV. Conclusion	
Many	business	cycle	theories	posit	that	monetary	shocks	have	real	effects	as	a	consequence	
of	the	existence	of	sticky	prices	and/or	sticky	wages.		Since	alternative	theories	have	distinct	
implications	for	the	cyclical	response	of	real	wages	to	a	monetary	policy	shock,	many	previous	
studies	have	examined	the	behavior	of	real	wages	in	order	to	draw	inferences	about	the	relative	
stickiness	of	prices	and	wages.		Early	studies	essentially	looked,	in	one	way	or	another,	at	the	
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correlation	between	the	real	wage	and	either	output	or	employment.		Such	correlations	will	tell	us	
little	or	nothing	about	the	response	to	monetary	shocks	if	the	data	are	generated	in	a	world	in	
which	there	are	nonmonetary	shocks	as	well.	
More	recent	studies	have	improved	on	this	state	of	affairs	by	using	structural	VAR	(SVAR)	
models	to	isolate	the	effects	of	monetary	policy	shocks	on	real	wages.		However,	the	validity	of	this	
approach	depends	on	the	assumption	that	the	response	of	real	wages	to	a	monetary	policy	shock	
reflects	only	the	relative	stickiness	of	wages	and	prices,	not	other	characteristics	of	the	economy.			
The	purpose	of	this	paper	has	been	to	examine	this	implicit	assumption.		Using	two	
different	DSGE	models,	we	have	examined	the	role	of	other	factors	in	explaining	the	cyclical	
response	of	real	wages	to	monetary	policy	changes	and	have	found	that	several	of	these	appear	to	
play	important	roles.		As	a	consequence,	to	draw	inferences	about	the	relative	stickiness	of	wages	
and	prices,	it	is	not	enough	to	look	at	how	real	wages	respond	to	monetary	policy.		It	seems	that	it	is	
necessary	to	find	direct	measures	of	the	stickiness	of	wages	and	prices.		SW	have	done	this	in	their	
model	since	they	estimate	the	Calvo	stickiness	parameters	using	historical	data.			
Though	we	only	look	at	how	characteristics	of	a	model	economy	affect	the	influence	of	
monetary	policy	on	real	wages,	the	response	of	other	variables	to	monetary	shocks	will	also	be	
affected	in	important	ways	by	characteristics	of	the	model.		Just	how	is	a	topic	for	future	research.		
All	of	this	reminds	us	that	while	the	transmission	mechanism	for	monetary	policy	may	not	seem	
complicated	in	these	and	related	models,	it	in	fact	depends	on	many	parameters	in	complex	ways.	
21 
 
References	
Ball,	Laurence,	N.	Gregory	Mankiw,	and	David	Romer.	“The	New	Keynesian	Economics	and	the	
Output‐Inflation	Tradeoff.”	Brookings	Papers	on	Economic	Activity,	1,	1988,	1‐65.	
Calvo,	Guillermo	A.	“Staggered	Prices	in	a	Utility‐Maximizing	Framework.”	Journal	of	Monetary	
Economics,	12.3,	September	1983,	383‐98.	
Christiano,	Lawrence,	Martin	Eichenbaum	and	Charles	Evans.	“Nominal	Rigidities	and	the	
Dynamic	Eﬀects	of	a	Shock	to	Monetary	Policy”,	Journal	of	Political	Economy	113.1,	February	
2005,	1‐45.	
Dixon,	Huw,	and	Engin	Kara.	“How	to	Compare	Taylor	and	Calvo	Contracts:	A	Comment	on	
Michael	Kiley.”	Journal	of	Money,	Credit,	and	Banking,	38.4,	June	2006,	1119‐26.	
Dunlop,	John	T.	“The	Movement	of	Real	and	Money	Wage	Rates.”	Economic	Journal,	September	
1938,	413‐34.	
Fischer,	Stanley.		“Long‐Term	Contracts,	Rational	Expectations,	and	the	Optimal	Money	Supply	
Rule.”	Journal	of	Political	Economy,	February	1977,	191‐205.	
 "Recent	Developments	in	Macroeconomics,"	Economic	Journal,	98.391	June	1988,	294‐339.	
Fleischman,	Charles	A.	“The	Causes	of	Business	Cycles	and	the	Cyclicality	of	Real	Wages.”	Journal	
of	Economic	Literature,	October	1999‐53.	Board	of	Governors	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System	
(U.S.).	
Gamber,	Edward	N.,	and	Frederick	L.	Joutz.	“The	Dynamic	Effects	of	Aggregate	Demand	and
	 Supply	Disturbances:	Comment.”	American	Economic	Review,	83.5,	December	1993,	1387‐93.	
Huang,	Kevin	X.	D.,	Zheng	Liu,	and	Louis	Phaneuf.	“Why	Does	Cyclical	Behavior	of	Real	Wages	
Change	Over	Time?”	American	Economic	Review,	94.4,	September	2004,	836‐56.	
Kimball,	Miles.	“The	Quantitative	Analytics	of	the	Basic	Neomonetarist	Model,"	Journal	of	Money,	
Credit	and	Banking,	November	1995,	27.4,	1241‐77.	
Mankiw,	N.	Gregory.	“Comment.”	NBER	Macroeconomics	Annual,	2,	1987,	105‐10.	
22 
 
McCallum,	Bennet	T.	“On	‘Real’	and	‘Sticky‐Price’	Theories	of	the	Business	Cycle.”	Journal	of	
Money,	Credit,	and	Banking,	November	1986,	397‐414.	
Smets,	Frank,	and	Rafael	Wouters.	“Shocks	and	Frictions	in	US	Business	Cycles:	A	Bayesian	DSGE	
Approach.”	American	Economic	review,	97.3,	June	2007,	586‐606.	
Spencer,	David	E.	“The	Relative	Stickiness	of	Wages	and	Prices.”	Economic	Inquiry,	36.1,	January	
1998,	120‐137.	
Sumner,	Scott,	and	Stephen	Silver.	“Real	Wages,	Employment,	and	the	Phillips	Curve.”	Journal	of	
Political	Economy,	June	1989,	706‐20.	
Taylor,	John.	“Aggregate	Dynamics	and	Staggered	Contracts.”	Journal	of	Political	Economy,	88.1,	
February	1980,	1‐23.	
 “Staggered	Price	and	Wage	Setting	in	Macroeconomics.”	in	J.B.	Taylor	and	M.	
Woodford	eds.,	Handbook	of	Macroeconomics,	1999,	chapter	15,	1341‐1397,	Elsevier,	New	
York.	
	
	
	
	
	
23 
 
Table	1:		Variation	in	the	real	wage	IRF	at	the	one‐quarter	horizon	in	response	to	a	one	percent	
increase	in	the	money	growth	rate	across	pairs	of	values	of	Np	and	Nw	and	for	selected	values	of	φ	in	
the	HLP	model.	
	
	
	(Interwar	calibrated	value)	
Price Stickiness (Np) 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (N
w
) 
1  9.29  15.33  19.99  23.81  27.06  29.90  32.43 
2  ‐1.32  0.02  1.28  2.33  3.21  3.97  4.63  5.23 
3  ‐1.75  ‐0.57  0.00  0.56  1.02  1.42  1.77  2.09 
4  ‐1.97  ‐0.84  ‐0.33  ‐0.01  0.31  0.58  0.81  1.02 
5  ‐2.13  ‐1.00  ‐0.51  ‐0.22  0.00  0.20  0.37  0.52 
6  ‐2.25  ‐1.10  ‐0.62  ‐0.34  ‐0.15  0.00  0.14  0.26 
7  ‐2.35  ‐1.18  ‐0.70  ‐0.42  ‐0.24  ‐0.10  0.00  0.11 
8  ‐2.44  ‐1.24  ‐0.75  ‐0.48  ‐0.30  ‐0.17  ‐0.07  0.01 
	
	
	(Postwar	calibrated	value)	
Price Stickiness (Np) 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (N
w
)  
1  12.01  19.12  24.30  28.44  31.94  34.99  37.73 
2  ‐1.32  0.46  1.94  3.13  4.11  4.94  5.67  6.32 
3  ‐1.75  ‐0.30  0.37  0.98  1.48  1.92  2.30  2.65 
4  ‐1.97  ‐0.60  ‐0.06  0.30  0.63  0.91  1.15  1.37 
5  ‐2.13  ‐0.76  ‐0.27  0.02  0.25  0.45  0.63  0.79 
6  ‐2.25  ‐0.87  ‐0.39  ‐0.12  0.06  0.21  0.35  0.47 
7  ‐2.35  ‐0.95  ‐0.47  ‐0.21  ‐0.05  0.08  0.18  0.28 
8  ‐2.44  ‐1.01  ‐0.53  ‐0.28  ‐0.12  0.00  0.09  0.16 
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Table	2:		Variation	in	the	real	wage	IRF	at	the	one‐quarter	horizon	in	response	to	a	one	percent	
increase	in	the	money	growth	rate	across	pairs	of	values	of	Np	and	Nw	and	for	selected	values	of	σ	in	
the	HLP	model.	
	
σ	=	1.5	(Wage	markup	=	3.0)	
Price Stickiness (Np)
   1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (N
w
)  1  12.01  19.12 24.30 28.44 31.94 34.99  37.73 2  ‐1.09  0.96  2.95 4.52 5.78 6.84 7.77  8.59 
3  ‐1.51  0.03  0.85 1.69 2.38 2.97 3.49  3.95 
4  ‐1.74  ‐0.33  0.27 0.72 1.18 1.57 1.91  2.22 
5  ‐1.89  ‐0.54  0.00 0.34 0.62 0.90 1.15  1.37 
6  ‐2.01  ‐0.67  ‐0.17 0.13 0.34 0.53 0.73  0.90 
7  ‐2.11  ‐0.76  ‐0.28 0.00 0.19 0.34 0.47  0.61 
8  ‐2.20  ‐0.83  ‐0.36 ‐0.10 0.08 0.21 0.32  0.42 
	
	
σ	=	3.0	(Wage	markup	=	1.5)	
Price Stickiness (Np)
   1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (N
w
)  1  12.01  19.12 24.30 28.44 31.94 34.99  37.73 2  ‐1.32  0.46  1.94 3.13 4.11 4.94 5.67  6.32 
3  ‐1.75  ‐0.30  0.37 0.98 1.48 1.92 2.30  2.65 
4  ‐1.97  ‐0.60  ‐0.06 0.30 0.63 0.91 1.15  1.37 
5  ‐2.13  ‐0.76  ‐0.27 0.02 0.25 0.45 0.63  0.79 
6  ‐2.25  ‐0.87  ‐0.39 ‐0.12 0.06 0.21 0.35  0.47 
7  ‐2.35  ‐0.95  ‐0.47 ‐0.21 ‐0.05 0.08 0.18  0.28 
8  ‐2.44  ‐1.01  ‐0.53 ‐0.28 ‐0.12 0.00 0.09  0.16 
	
	
σ	=	11.0	(Wage	markup	=	1.1)	
Price Stickiness (Np)
   1  2  3 4 5 6 7  8 
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (N
w
)  1  12.01  19.12 24.30 28.44 31.94 34.99  37.73 
2  ‐1.91  ‐0.42  0.42 1.05 1.56 2.00 2.39  2.74 
3  ‐2.31  ‐0.90  ‐0.38 ‐0.02 0.25 0.47 0.66  0.82 
4  ‐2.53  ‐1.09  ‐0.59 ‐0.32 ‐0.12 0.04 0.16  0.26 
5  ‐2.56  ‐1.19  ‐0.69 ‐0.43 ‐0.27 ‐0.14 ‐0.04  0.04 
6  ‐2.55  ‐1.25  ‐0.75 ‐0.49 ‐0.34 ‐0.23 ‐0.14  ‐0.07 
7  ‐2.54  ‐1.29  ‐0.79 ‐0.53 ‐0.37 ‐0.27 ‐0.19  ‐0.13 
8  ‐2.53  ‐1.32  ‐0.81 ‐0.55 ‐0.39 ‐0.29 ‐0.22  ‐0.17 
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Table	3:		Variation	in	the	real	wage	IRF	at	the	one‐quarter	horizon	in	response	to	a	one	percent	
increase	in	the	money	growth	rate	across	pairs	of	values	of	Np	and	Nw	and	for	selected	values	of	 	in	
the	HLP	model.	
	
	
	=	1.00	
Price Stickiness (Np) 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (N
w
)  1  7.67  11.71  14.50  16.67  18.50  20.10  21.54 2  ‐1.27  0.41  1.68  2.62  3.36  3.97  4.49  4.95 
3  ‐1.68  ‐0.29  0.33  0.87  1.30  1.65  1.96  2.23 
4  ‐1.90  ‐0.57  ‐0.06  0.27  0.57  0.81  1.02  1.21 
5  ‐2.05  ‐0.73  ‐0.25  0.03  0.23  0.42  0.57  0.71 
6  ‐2.17  ‐0.83  ‐0.37  ‐0.11  0.06  0.20  0.33  0.43 
7  ‐2.26  ‐0.91  ‐0.44  ‐0.20  ‐0.04  0.08  0.18  0.27 
8  ‐2.35  ‐0.97  ‐0.50  ‐0.26  ‐0.10  0.00  0.09  0.16 
	
	
	
	
	=	1.50	
Price Stickiness (Np) 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (N
w
)  1  9.97  15.59  19.59  22.77  25.44  27.77  29.87 2  ‐1.30  0.44  1.84  2.93  3.81  4.55  5.19  5.76 
3  ‐1.72  ‐0.30  0.36  0.94  1.41  1.82  2.17  2.48 
4  ‐1.95  ‐0.59  ‐0.06  0.29  0.61  0.87  1.10  1.31 
5  ‐2.10  ‐0.75  ‐0.26  0.03  0.24  0.44  0.61  0.76 
6  ‐2.22  ‐0.85  ‐0.38  ‐0.12  0.06  0.21  0.34  0.46 
7  ‐2.31  ‐0.93  ‐0.46  ‐0.21  ‐0.04  0.08  0.18  0.28 
8  ‐2.40  ‐0.99  ‐0.52  ‐0.27  ‐0.11  0.00  0.09  0.16 
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Table	3	(cont.)	
	
	
	
	
	
	=	3.00	
Price Stickiness (Np) 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (N
w
) 
1  15.56  25.42  32.85  38.86  43.95  48.40  52.36 
2  ‐1.34  0.48  2.06  3.37  4.48  5.45  6.31  7.07 
3  ‐1.77  ‐0.31  0.38  1.03  1.56  2.04  2.46  2.85 
4  ‐2.00  ‐0.61  ‐0.06  0.30  0.65  0.95  1.21  1.45 
5  ‐2.16  ‐0.78  ‐0.27  0.02  0.25  0.47  0.65  0.82 
6  ‐2.28  ‐0.89  ‐0.40  ‐0.13  0.06  0.21  0.36  0.49 
7  ‐2.39  ‐0.96  ‐0.48  ‐0.22  ‐0.05  0.08  0.19  0.29 
8  ‐2.44  ‐1.02  ‐0.54  ‐0.28  ‐0.12  0.00  0.09  0.16 
	
	
	
	
	=	10.0	
Price Stickiness (Np) 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (N
w
) 
1  32.52  55.70 75.08 91.79 106.41  119.39  131.03 
2  ‐1.38  0.51  2.27  3.81  5.20  6.46  7.62  8.69 
3  ‐1.82  ‐0.32  0.41  1.11  1.71  2.26  2.76  3.23 
4  ‐2.06  ‐0.63  ‐0.07  0.32  0.70  1.02  1.32  1.59 
5  ‐2.22  ‐0.80  ‐0.28  0.02  0.26  0.50  0.70  0.88 
6  ‐2.35  ‐0.91  ‐0.41  ‐0.13  0.06  0.22  0.38  0.51 
7  ‐2.44  ‐0.99  ‐0.50  ‐0.23  ‐0.05  0.08  0.19  0.30 
8  ‐2.45  ‐1.05  ‐0.56  ‐0.29  ‐0.13  ‐0.01  0.09  0.17 
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Table	4:		Variation	in	the	real	wage	IRF	at	the	one‐quarter	horizon	in	response	to	a	one‐standard‐
deviation	decline	in	the	interest	rate	across	pairs	of	values	of	ξp	and	ξw	in	the	SW	model.	
	
Price Stickiness (ξp) 
   0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0 
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (ξ w
) 
0.0  0.20  0.32  0.43  0.54  0.65  0.77  0.91  1.09  1.43  2.43 
0.1  ‐0.01  0.15  0.26  0.35  0.44  0.53  0.63  0.75  0.91  1.22  2.13 
0.2  ‐0.01  0.12  0.20  0.28  0.35  0.43  0.51  0.61  0.75  1.03  1.85 
0.3  ‐0.01  0.09  0.15  0.21  0.27  0.34  0.41  0.49  0.60  0.85  1.59 
0.4  ‐0.02  0.06  0.11  0.16  0.20  0.25  0.31  0.38  0.47  0.68  1.35 
0.5  ‐0.02  0.03  0.07  0.11  0.14  0.18  0.22  0.27  0.35  0.53  1.11 
0.6  ‐0.03  0.01  0.04  0.06  0.09  0.11  0.15  0.18  0.24  0.39  0.88 
0.7  ‐0.03  ‐0.01  0.01  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.11  0.15  0.26  0.66 
0.8  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.04  0.07  0.15  0.44 
0.9  ‐0.05  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.00  0.01  0.06  0.22 
1.0  ‐0.08  ‐0.07  ‐0.06  ‐0.05  ‐0.05  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.01    
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Table	5:		Variation	in	the	real	wage	IRF	at	the	one‐quarter	horizon	in	response	to	a	one‐standard‐
deviation	decline	in	the	interest	rate	across	pairs	of	values	of	ξp	and	ξw	and	for	selected	values	of	 ,	
given	 	=	1.6,	in	the	SW	model.	
	
		=	1.5	(Wage	markup	=	3.0)	
Price Stickiness (ξp)
   0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7  0.8  0.9 1.0
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (ξ w
) 
0.0  0.20  0.33  0.44 0.54 0.65 0.77 0.91  1.09  1.42 1.96
0.1  ‐0.01  0.14  0.24  0.33 0.41 0.50 0.60 0.71  0.86  1.15 1.63
0.2  ‐0.01  0.10  0.18  0.25 0.31 0.38 0.46 0.55  0.68  0.94 1.36
0.3  ‐0.02  0.07  0.13  0.18 0.23 0.29 0.35 0.42  0.53  0.75 1.13
0.4  ‐0.02  0.04  0.09  0.13 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.31  0.40  0.59 0.93
0.5  ‐0.02  0.02  0.05  0.08 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.22  0.29  0.45 0.74
0.6  ‐0.03  0.00  0.02  0.04 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.14  0.19  0.33 0.57
0.7  ‐0.04  ‐0.02  0.00  0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08  0.11  0.22 0.41
0.8  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.01 ‐0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03  0.05  0.12 0.26
0.9  ‐0.06  ‐0.05  ‐0.04  ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.01  0.01  0.05 0.12
1.0  ‐0.07  ‐0.06  ‐0.05  ‐0.05 ‐0.04 ‐0.04 ‐0.03 ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.02  
	
	
	
		=	3.0	(Wage	markup	=	1.5)	
Price Stickiness (ξp)
   0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8  0.9 1.0
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (ξ w
) 
0.0  0.20  0.33  0.44 0.55 0.66 0.78 0.92  1.09  1.39 2.18
0.1  ‐0.01  0.09  0.16  0.23 0.29 0.36 0.43 0.52  0.64  0.87 1.52
0.2  ‐0.02  0.05  0.10  0.14 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.34  0.43  0.62 1.19
0.3  ‐0.02  0.02  0.05  0.08 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.23  0.30  0.46 0.95
0.4  ‐0.03  0.00  0.03  0.05 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.15  0.21  0.34 0.77
0.5  ‐0.03  ‐0.01  0.00  0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.10  0.14  0.25 0.61
0.6  ‐0.04  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05  0.08  0.17 0.47
0.7  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.03  ‐0.02 ‐0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02  0.04  0.11 0.35
0.8  ‐0.05  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.02 ‐0.01 0.00  0.01  0.06 0.22
0.9  ‐0.06  ‐0.06  ‐0.05  ‐0.04 ‐0.04 ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.02 0.10
1.0  ‐0.09  ‐0.08  ‐0.08  ‐0.07 ‐0.06 ‐0.05 ‐0.04 ‐0.03  ‐0.01  0.00  
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Table	5	(cont.)	
	
		=	11.0	(Wage	markup	=	1.1)	
Price Stickiness (ξp)
   0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7  0.8  0.9 1.0
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (ξ w
) 
0.0  0.20  0.33  0.44 0.55 0.67 0.79 0.93  1.09  1.37 1.74
0.1  ‐0.02  0.02  0.06  0.09 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.25  0.32  0.48 0.75
0.2  ‐0.03  0.00  0.02  0.03 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.13  0.18  0.30 0.52
0.3  ‐0.04  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07  0.11  0.21 0.39
0.4  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04  0.07  0.14 0.29
0.5  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.02 ‐0.01 ‐0.01 0.00 0.01  0.04  0.10 0.22
0.6  ‐0.05  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  ‐0.03 ‐0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.01 0.00  0.02  0.07 0.16
0.7  ‐0.05  ‐0.05  ‐0.04  ‐0.04 ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.02 ‐0.01  0.00  0.04 0.11
0.8  ‐0.06  ‐0.05  ‐0.05  ‐0.04 ‐0.04 ‐0.04 ‐0.03 ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.02 0.06
0.9  ‐0.08  ‐0.07  ‐0.06  ‐0.06 ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.04 ‐0.03  ‐0.02  0.00 0.02
1.0  ‐0.09  ‐0.08  ‐0.08  ‐0.07 ‐0.06 ‐0.05 ‐0.04 ‐0.03  ‐0.02  0.00  
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Table	6:		Variation	in	the	real	wage	IRF	at	the	one‐quarter	horizon	in	response	to	a	one‐standard‐
deviation	decline	in	the	interest	rate	across	pairs	of	values	of	ξp	and	ξw	and	for	selected	values	of	 ,	
given	 	=	1.5,	in	the	SW	model.	
	
		=	1.5	(Price	markup	=	3.0)	
Price Stickiness (ξp) 
   0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0 
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (ξ w
) 
0.0  0.62  0.78  0.90  1.00  1.10  1.24  1.46  1.84  2.39  2.62 
0.1  0.00  0.51  0.64  0.74  0.83  0.93  1.05  1.25  1.59  2.09  2.30 
0.2  0.00  0.41  0.52  0.61  0.68  0.77  0.88  1.05  1.36  1.81  2.00 
0.3  0.00  0.32  0.41  0.48  0.55  0.62  0.72  0.88  1.15  1.55  1.72 
0.4  0.00  0.24  0.32  0.37  0.42  0.49  0.57  0.71  0.95  1.30  1.45 
0.5  0.00  0.17  0.23  0.27  0.31  0.36  0.44  0.55  0.76  1.07  1.20 
0.6  0.00  0.11  0.15  0.18  0.22  0.26  0.31  0.41  0.58  0.84  0.95 
0.7  0.00  0.06  0.09  0.11  0.13  0.16  0.21  0.28  0.42  0.62  0.70 
0.8  ‐0.01  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.08  0.11  0.17  0.26  0.41  0.47 
0.9  ‐0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.07  0.12  0.20  0.23 
1.0  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.05  0.09    
	
	
	
			=	3.0	(Price	markup	=	1.5)	
Price Stickiness (ξp) 
   0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0 
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (ξ w
) 
0.0  0.35  0.51  0.63  0.74  0.84  0.95  1.08  1.29  1.81  2.63 
0.1  0.00  0.28  0.41  0.51  0.61  0.70  0.79  0.91  1.09  1.57  2.31 
0.2  ‐0.01  0.22  0.33  0.41  0.49  0.57  0.65  0.75  0.91  1.34  2.01 
0.3  ‐0.01  0.17  0.26  0.32  0.39  0.45  0.52  0.60  0.75  1.13  1.73 
0.4  ‐0.01  0.13  0.19  0.24  0.29  0.34  0.40  0.47  0.60  0.94  1.47 
0.5  ‐0.01  0.09  0.13  0.17  0.21  0.25  0.29  0.35  0.46  0.75  1.21 
0.6  ‐0.01  0.05  0.08  0.11  0.14  0.17  0.20  0.25  0.33  0.58  0.97 
0.7  ‐0.02  0.02  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.10  0.12  0.15  0.22  0.41  0.72 
0.8  ‐0.02  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.07  0.12  0.26  0.48 
0.9  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.12  0.24 
1.0  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  0.00  0.01  0.03    
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Table	6	(cont.)	
	
		=	11.0	(Price	markup	=	1.1)	
Price Stickiness (ξp) 
   0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0 
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (ξ w
) 
0.0  0.18  0.30  0.41  0.51  0.62  0.74  0.88  1.06  1.39  1.93 
0.1  ‐0.01  0.14  0.24  0.33  0.42  0.51  0.61  0.73  0.89  1.18  1.67 
0.2  ‐0.01  0.11  0.19  0.26  0.33  0.41  0.49  0.60  0.73  0.99  1.44 
0.3  ‐0.02  0.08  0.14  0.20  0.26  0.32  0.39  0.47  0.59  0.82  1.22 
0.4  ‐0.02  0.05  0.10  0.15  0.19  0.24  0.29  0.36  0.46  0.66  1.01 
0.5  ‐0.02  0.03  0.06  0.10  0.13  0.17  0.21  0.26  0.34  0.51  0.82 
0.6  ‐0.03  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.08  0.11  0.14  0.18  0.23  0.37  0.63 
0.7  ‐0.04  ‐0.01  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.07  0.10  0.14  0.25  0.46 
0.8  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.07  0.14  0.29 
0.9  ‐0.06  ‐0.05  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  0.01  0.05  0.14 
1.0  ‐0.07  ‐0.06  ‐0.05  ‐0.05  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.02    
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Table	7:		Variation	in	the	real	wage	IRF	at	the	one‐quarter	horizon	in	response	to	a	one‐standard‐
deviation	decline	in	the	interest	rate	across	pairs	of	values	of	ξp	and	ξw	and	for	selected	values	of	σl	
in	the	SW	model.	
	
σl	=	1.00	
Price Stickiness (ξp)
   0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8  0.9 1.0
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (ξ w
) 
0.0  0.19  0.32  0.42 0.53 0.63 0.75 0.87  1.04  1.39 2.41
0.1  ‐0.01  0.15  0.25  0.34 0.42 0.51 0.61 0.72  0.86  1.17 2.08
0.2  ‐0.01  0.11  0.20  0.27 0.34 0.41 0.49 0.58  0.70  0.97 1.78
0.3  ‐0.02  0.08  0.15  0.20 0.26 0.32 0.38 0.45  0.55  0.79 1.51
0.4  ‐0.02  0.06  0.10  0.15 0.19 0.23 0.28 0.34  0.43  0.63 1.25
0.5  ‐0.02  0.03  0.07  0.10 0.13 0.16 0.20 0.25  0.31  0.48 1.01
0.6  ‐0.03  0.01  0.03  0.06 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.16  0.21  0.35 0.78
0.7  ‐0.04  ‐0.01  0.01  0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09  0.12  0.23 0.57
0.8  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03  0.06  0.13 0.37
0.9  ‐0.06  ‐0.05  ‐0.04  ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.02 ‐0.01 ‐0.01  0.01  0.05 0.18
1.0  ‐0.08  ‐0.07  ‐0.06  ‐0.06 ‐0.05 ‐0.04 ‐0.03 ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.01  
	
	
	
	
σl	=	1.50	
Price Stickiness (ξp)
   0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8  0.9 1.0
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (ξ w
)	 
0.0  0.19  0.32  0.43 0.54 0.65 0.77 0.90  1.07  1.42 2.42
0.1  ‐0.01  0.15  0.26  0.35 0.44 0.53 0.63 0.75  0.90  1.21 2.12
0.2  ‐0.01  0.12  0.20  0.28 0.35 0.42 0.51 0.61  0.74  1.01 1.84
0.3  ‐0.02  0.09  0.15  0.21 0.27 0.33 0.40 0.48  0.59  0.84 1.57
0.4  ‐0.02  0.06  0.11  0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.37  0.46  0.67 1.33
0.5  ‐0.02  0.03  0.07  0.11 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.27  0.34  0.52 1.09
0.6  ‐0.03  0.01  0.04  0.06 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.18  0.24  0.38 0.86
0.7  ‐0.03  ‐0.01  0.01  0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10  0.14  0.26 0.64
0.8  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04  0.07  0.15 0.42
0.9  ‐0.05  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.02 ‐0.01 0.00  0.01  0.06 0.21
1.0  ‐0.08  ‐0.07  ‐0.06  ‐0.06 ‐0.05 ‐0.04 ‐0.03 ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.01  
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Table	7	(cont.)	
	
σl	=	3.00	
Price Stickiness (ξp)
   0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8  0.9 1.0
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (ξ w
) 
0.0  0.20  0.34  0.46 0.57 0.69 0.82 0.98  1.17  1.52 2.47
0.1  ‐0.01  0.16  0.27  0.37 0.47 0.57 0.69 0.82  1.00  1.32 2.22
0.2  ‐0.01  0.13  0.22  0.30 0.38 0.47 0.57 0.68  0.84  1.13 1.98
0.3  ‐0.01  0.10  0.17  0.23 0.30 0.37 0.45 0.55  0.69  0.96 1.74
0.4  ‐0.02  0.07  0.12  0.18 0.23 0.29 0.35 0.43  0.55  0.79 1.51
0.5  ‐0.02  0.04  0.08  0.12 0.16 0.21 0.26 0.33  0.42  0.63 1.28
0.6  ‐0.02  0.02  0.05  0.08 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.23  0.30  0.47 1.05
0.7  ‐0.03  0.00  0.02  0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.14  0.19  0.33 0.81
0.8  ‐0.04  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06  0.10  0.19 0.56
0.9  ‐0.05  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.03 ‐0.02 ‐0.01 ‐0.01 0.00  0.02  0.08 0.29
1.0  ‐0.07  ‐0.06  ‐0.06  ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.04 ‐0.03 ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.02  
	
	
	
	
σl	=	10.0	
Price Stickiness (ξp)
   0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7  0.8  0.9 1.0
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (ξ w
) 
0.0  0.24  0.40  0.54 0.69 0.84 1.01 1.22  1.48  1.87 2.70
0.1  ‐0.01  0.20  0.34  0.46 0.59 0.73 0.88 1.07  1.32  1.70 2.55
0.2  ‐0.01  0.16  0.28  0.39 0.50 0.62 0.76 0.93  1.16  1.52 2.38
0.3  ‐0.01  0.13  0.23  0.32 0.41 0.51 0.63 0.79  0.99  1.34 2.21
0.4  ‐0.01  0.10  0.17  0.25 0.32 0.41 0.51 0.65  0.83  1.15 2.02
0.5  ‐0.01  0.07  0.13  0.19 0.25 0.32 0.40 0.51  0.67  0.96 1.82
0.6  ‐0.02  0.04  0.08  0.13 0.17 0.23 0.29 0.38  0.50  0.76 1.58
0.7  ‐0.02  0.02  0.04  0.07 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.25  0.34  0.55 1.30
0.8  ‐0.03  ‐0.01  0.01  0.03 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.13  0.19  0.34 0.97
0.9  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.01 ‐0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03  0.06  0.15 0.53
1.0  ‐0.06  ‐0.05  ‐0.05  ‐0.04 ‐0.04 ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.02  0.00  0.03  
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
34 
 
Table	8:		Variation	in	the	real	wage	IRF	at	the	one‐quarter	horizon	in	response	to	a	one‐standard‐
deviation	decline	in	the	interest	rate	across	pairs	of	values	of	ξp	and	ξw	and	for	selected	values	of	εw,	
given		εp		=	0,	in	the	SW	model.	
	
εw	=	0,	εp		=	0	(Dixit‐Stiglitz	case)	
Price Stickiness (ξp)
   0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8  0.9 1.0
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (ξ w
) 
0.0  0.04  0.10  0.16 0.23 0.31 0.41 0.54 0.72  1.00 1.62
0.1  ‐0.01  0.04  0.09  0.14 0.21 0.28 0.38 0.50 0.66  0.93 1.51
0.2  ‐0.01  0.03  0.07  0.13 0.18 0.25 0.34 0.45 0.60  0.84 1.40
0.3  ‐0.01  0.02  0.06  0.11 0.16 0.22 0.29 0.39 0.53  0.75 1.27
0.4  ‐0.01  0.02  0.05  0.09 0.13 0.18 0.25 0.33 0.45  0.65 1.13
0.5  ‐0.02  0.01  0.04  0.07 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.27 0.37  0.54 0.97
0.6  ‐0.02  0.00  0.02  0.04 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.28  0.42 0.80
0.7  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.00  0.02 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.19  0.29 0.61
0.8  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  ‐0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.10  0.16 0.40
0.9  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.02 ‐0.01 0.00 0.02  0.05 0.19
1.0  ‐0.06  ‐0.06  ‐0.06  ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.04 ‐0.04 ‐0.03  ‐0.01  
	
	
	
	
εw	=	33,	εp		=	0	
Price Stickiness (ξp) 
   0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0 
W
ag
e S
tic
ki
ne
ss
 (ξ w
) 
0.0  0.04  0.10  0.16  0.23  0.31  0.41  0.54  0.72  1.00  1.61 
0.1  ‐0.01  0.02  0.05  0.09  0.14  0.20  0.26  0.35  0.48  0.69  1.19 
0.2  ‐0.02  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.09  0.13  0.18  0.24  0.34  0.50  0.91 
0.3  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.08  0.12  0.17  0.24  0.36  0.71 
0.4  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.05  0.07  0.11  0.16  0.25  0.54 
0.5  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.07  0.10  0.17  0.41 
0.6  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.11  0.30 
0.7  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.00  0.02  0.05  0.20 
0.8  ‐0.05  ‐0.05  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.02  0.12 
0.9  ‐0.06  ‐0.06  ‐0.06  ‐0.05  ‐0.05  ‐0.05  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.03  ‐0.01  0.05 
1.0  ‐0.10  ‐0.09  ‐0.09  ‐0.09  ‐0.08  ‐0.08  ‐0.07  ‐0.06  ‐0.04  ‐0.02    
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
